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Simple Methods to Assess the Credibility of the 
Hungarian Inflation Targeting Regime 
Miklós Erdélyi1 –Szabolcs Szikszai2 
 
In our paper, we introduce simple approaches to asses  the credibility of the Hungarian in-
flation targeting (IT) monetary policy regime in the period between July 2001 and April 
2009. First, we present the findings of a non-representative survey we conducted amongst 
the major stakeholders of monetary policy. The results of the survey suggest that, according 
to financial market players, the National Bank of Hungary (MNB) lost some of its credibility 
between 2002 and 2007.We then apply simple methods o assess the success of the IT regime 
and to measure the predictability and gradualism of the decisions of the MNB’s Monetary 
Council (MC) and the consistency of central bank communication. The results of this analy-
sis show that the time series of the inflation measure using unchanged tax rates became sta-
tionary after the introduction of IT in 2001, while the predictability and gradualism of MNB 
MC’s policy rate decisions and the consistency of central bank communication each dis-
played low levels in the observed period. 
 
Keywords: communication, credibility, inflation targeting, predictability 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Credibility of the inflation targeting monetary policy regime 
Since price stability became the primary objective of monetary policy authorities 
around the world, inflation targeting has been the most widely acclaimed central 
banking technique. No country that has ever introduce  an IT regime abandoned it 
later. Blinder (2006) points out that countries which desire disinflation are more 
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likely to introduce inflation targeting but its advantages for any type of economy are 
clear. In a wide cross-country panel study, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) 
show that inflation targeting helps keep inflation l w in the long run, improves the 
efficiency of monetary policy and strengthens central bank independence in various 
types of economies ranging from large industrial economies such as Germany, Can-
ada or the United Kingdom to emerging economies such as Brazil, Turkey or Korea. 
However, their analysis also concludes that the monetary policy performance of in-
dustrial-country inflation targeters dominates that of emerging countries. That is, 
inflation targeting has so far been more successfully adopted by industrial econo-
mies than by emerging ones. 
For an inflation targeting regime to be successful in an emerging economy – 
i.e. to achieve its inflation target –, it needs to be more than the simple announce-
ment of a medium-term inflation target. According to Mishkin (2004), the strategy 
of an inflation targeting central bank also needs to be information inclusive, trans-
parent and supported by good communication, with policy-makers held accountable 
for the success of their policy actions. All this is what, Mishkin (2004) says, it takes 
to make inflation targeting succeed in reducing inflation in emerging economies. 
 
1.1.1. The role of expectations in monetary policymaking 
Using Michael Woodford’s phrasing, central banking s an art of “management of 
expectations” (Woodford, 2005, p. 3), and central bnks can consider themselves 
successful when they manage market expectations in a way that leads to lower infla-
tion in the long run. A part of these expectations is formed of the evolution of mar-
ket prices of financial assets and another part is formed of the policy moves of the 
central bank itself as reacting to changing economic and market conditions. Based 
on certain signals, financial investors might expect a entral bank to act in a way that 
is in line with its strategy (e.g. reducing inflation) or they might expect otherwise. 
To put it differently, investors might think of a central bank as a more or a less 
credible one. Either way, the result of their expectations is fed back into the prices of 
financial assets, continuously changing the market setting in which the central bank 
operates. Thus, monetary policy success hinges to a great extent on the ability of the 
central bank to make itself look credible in the eys of financial market investors. 
 
1.1.2. Concepts of credibility of monetary policy 
A general perception of a central bank’s credibility is a key component of success 
not only in itself but also because it can contribute the most to reaching the policy 
target. In fact, all of the points mentioned by Mishkin (2004), above, have to do with 
the drive on the central bank’s part to establish credibility of its actions among the 
investors in financial markets. This is because, if a monetary policy regime is 
thought to be credible, expectations of the target variable become well-anchored to 
the target and fewer and more gradual policy moves ar  required to reach this target 
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(Amisano-Tronzano 2005). In this context, market perceptions of the inflation aver-
sion of an inflation targeting central bank play a crucial role in making inflation tar-
geting operate more effectively. As Blinder (1999) points out, a more credible cen-
tral bank can engineer disinflation with a lower level of employment sacrifice as 
changes in the key monetary policy instrument will cause smaller GDP/employment 
gap volatility. 
In his study based on a survey among central bankers and economists, Blinder 
(1999) shows that central bankers mostly identify credibility with “dedication to 
price stability” (Blinder 1999). An important, and difficult, issue is to measure this 
dedication. Obviously, when an inflation targeting regime is successful in keeping 
inflation low, it becomes credible. In other words, a central bank becomes credible 
when it matches its words with its deeds, i.e. if it says that it will and, indeed, does 
bring inflation down. But this is a simple, x post assessment of credibility, based on 
the track record of the inflation-targeting central b nk. A more dynamic assessment 
of credibility, suited to real-life circumstances, comes from the measure of per-
ceived, ex ante credibility as seen by investors in financial markets. In this context, 
an inflation targeting central bank, dedicated to price stability, is said to be credible 
when the perception of its pre-commitment to disinflation or, in other words, its 
aversion to inflation as perceived by and implied by market prices of financial assets 
is high.  
 
1.1.3. Predictability of monetary policy 
After Mishkin (2004), transparency is an important element of a credible inflation 
targeting regime, but this can generally be said of any kind of monetary policy re-
gime. Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002) opine that trnsparency “facilitates the under-
standing of what the central bank does and by doing so, it helps central banks to fos-
ter their credibility” (Perez-Quiros-Sicilia 2002). The practical manifestation of the 
transparency of a central bank is the predictability of its policy moves. Assessing the 
degree of predictability of policy moves, therefore, has been given great considera-
tion in the academic literature, lately. The degree of predictability as implied by fi-
nancial market prices, according to Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002), shows how 
transparent a central bank is in the eyes of financial market participants. In other 
words, predictability is a measure of how well market participants understand mone-
tary policy strategy and how precisely they anticipate future policy actions under 
various market conditions. In this vein, higher predictability of policy moves helps 
build central bank credibility. While measuring credibility itself can prove to be a 
difficult task, measuring predictability of both market interest rates in general and 
base rate decisions in specific is more straightforward. Evaluating credibility as im-
plied by market prices gives a good proxy for a central bank’s credibility as seen by 
market participants. 
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1.1.4. Central bank communication 
An issue of high importance is how credibility can be established. Still after Mishkin 
(2004), a key component of building credibility by making it more predictable is 
good communication, which has lately become a central goal in monetary policy-
making (see Woodford 2005). The most important taskof a central bank striving for 
good market perception of its credibility is to communicate well. This is because 
communication gives a firsthand feedback to financil investors as to whether the 
central bank consistently follows the monetary strategy laid out for itself. First of all, 
investors can test whether communication is aligned with the monetary policy strat-
egy. In case of an inflation targeter, each act of communication has to reflect the 
logic of disinflation. Financial investors will then match central bank communica-
tion with policy actions and see for themselves whether communication is useful or 
useless in signaling policy moves. If financial investors see a central bank that “will 
do what it says” (Blinder 1999), they will conclude that the signals of this particular 
central bank are indicative and will act accordingly. This will be reflected in the 
prices of major financial assets, i.e. they will move in the direction in which the cen-
tral bank ushers them with communication. This is the process of building credibil-
ity. In case communication is inconsistent with policy actions, however, financial 
investors will conclude that central bank communication is confusing and will ig-
nore it and focus instead on the very policy actions. I vestors will reach the same 
conclusion when communication is inconsistent within itself. It might happen e.g. 
when policy-makers communicate the direct opposite of what they communicated a 
day before or, when policy-makers communicate ambiguously. These are the proc-
esses of destroying credibility. 
In short, besides being a dynamic endogenous variable, credibility is also an 
important exogenous factor in policy-making. After economic agents obtain a cer-
tain perception of the inflation aversion of a central bank – partly through its com-
munication –, this perception of credibility then feeds back into monetary policy 
actions and increases (when credibility is high) or decreases (when credibility is 
low) their effectiveness. 
1.2. Evolving perceptions of MNB’s credibility in the IT regime 
The issue of the market perception of credibility is especially delicate in Hungary, 
where, in June 2001, the Monetary Council decided to switch to another monetary 
policy regime by introducing a converging inflation target. As it has been shown in 
earlier examples3, the need to establish a strong feeling of an inflation-averse author-
                                                   
3  These examples include any central bank switching from one monetary policy regime to 
another – e.g. inflation targeting –, or, as it happened to the European Central Bank (ECB), any central 
bank being established from the scratch. The emphasis in the case of MNB is on the switch to another 
regime coupled with new legislation warranting full independence for MNB – a constellation of condi-
tions never seen before. 
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ity amongst financial investors is of key importance for the central bank to operate a 
successful inflation targeting regime (see the case of the European Central Bank in 
Goldberg-Klein 2005). In other words, for a central b nk switching to another re-
gime, like the National Bank of Hungary (MNB) did in 2001, the most important, 
but also the most tedious and, sometimes, painful task is the establishment of a 
strong market perception of credibility.  
Seemingly, the success of the new inflation targetin  regime in Hungary was 
warranted by new legislation that brought major changes into the operational back-
ground of monetary policymaking4. But, as it eventually turned out, the MNB had to 
grapple with the still dual nature of the Hungarian monetary policy framework. 
There emerged an inherent contradiction between the IT r gime and MNB’s legal 
obligation to keep the euro-forint exchange rate within a ±15% floatation band 
around the parity rate. Raising the policy rate to bring inflation down strengthened 
the forint against the euro and, thus, threatened to push the exchange rate out of the 
floatation band. Still, the MNB had to establish the credibility of its inflation target-
ing regime and maintain the credibility of the floatation band of the euro-forint ex-
change rate at the same time. The eventual clash of these monetary policy tasks had 
an adverse impact on the market perception of credibility of MNB’s IT regime5. 
Sadly enough, the market perception of the central bank’s credibility was exacer-
bated by inconsistent central bank communication. Apart from that, the conspicuous 
lack of coordination between fiscal and monetary policy-makers – an example of 
which is presented in Madár (2003) – contributed to MNB’s missing the inflation 
target in the majority of the cases and further damaged the credibility of the IT re-
gime in the eyes of the investors. 
                                                   
4  The new legislative background of monetary policy was created in three key steps. First, on 
May 3, 2001, MNB MC and the government jointly decided to widen the floatation band of the euro-
forint exchange rate from ±2.25% to ±15% as of May 4. The crawling devaluation of the floatation 
band was later abolished as of October 1, 2001. Second, MNB MC decided to introduce the IT regime 
on June 12, 2001. Third, the new Act LVIII on the National Bank of Hungary came into effect on July 
13, 2001, providing MNB full operational and personal independence in its efforts to achieve and main-
tain price stability. All this information along with the latest version of the central bank act is avail ble 
at www.mnb.hu. 
5  Press evidence (see Nyíri 2003 or The Economist 2004, amongst others) supports the view 
that the market perception of credibility of MNB’s IT regime suffered a decisive blow in the turbulent 
period between October 2002 and November 2003, when the central bank was continually faced with 
the dilemma to decide between acting in the logic of the IT regime and acting to keep the euro-forint 
exchange rate within the floatation band. When, due to speculative pressure, the exchange rate reached 
the strong limit of the band, the MNB decided that maintaining the band was more important. But, 
later, it decided with the government to shift the parity of the band in the weaker direction, which, then, 
forced it to put aside the IT logic again to defend the exchange rate of the forint. This chain of events 
was especially detrimental to the perception of credibility of the IT regime and, apparently, MNB later 
could by no means recover the substantial loss of credibility suffered in this sub period (Rozkrut et al.
2007, p. 194). 
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The purpose of this paper is to provide insight into the evolution of the finan-
cial market perception of the credibility of MNB’s IT regime in the period between 
June 2001 and April 2009. We seek answers to the following basic questions related 
to the credibility of the IT regime, which might serv  as springboards to more com-
plex issues of central bank credibility6: 
1. What does narrative evidence tell us about the evolution of the perceived 
credibility of the Hungarian monetary policy in the observed period? 
2. Was the introduction of inflation targeting in Hungary successful in an-
choring inflation?  
3. Were MNB MC’s interest rate decisions predictable in the observed pe-
riod? 
4. Did central bank communication signal future policy rate decisions prop-
erly? 
2. Narrative consensus on the concept of credibility in Hungarian monetary 
policy  
We conducted a short survey with the purpose of investigating the market perception 
of credibility of monetary policy in general and tha  of the monetary policy con-
ducted by the MNB between 2002 and 2007. Between May and August 2008, we 
asked chief financial officers of domestic corporations, analysts of leading commer-
cial banks and consulting firms and other economists following monetary policy 
events about what they think about credibility in general and about MNB’s credibil-
ity in specific. 
2.1. Participants of the survey 
The questionnaire and the list of responding institutions are available on request, but 
we insert here, in table 1, the composition of the respondents according to sectors. 
                                                   
6  This paper is part of an extensive research by the authors into the evolving market perception 
of credibility of the Hungarian monetary policy. Inthis paper, we concentrate – without going into 
historical details – on the fundamental issues of the IT regime alone and disregard credibility issues 
connected with the exchange rate band and fiscal policy. 
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Table 1.  Number of respondents by sectors 
Energy, public utility 9 22% 
Finance 9 22% 
Manufacturing 7 17% 
Commerce 5 12% 
Transport, postal, info communications 5 12% 
Consulting 3 7% 
Construction 1 2% 
Regulation 1 2% 
Education 1 2% 
Total 41 100% 
Source: own creation 
Our methods of distributing the questionnaire included mailing the questionnaire to 
85 companies listed in the 2007 edition of TOP 200 – an annually printed special 
issue of weekly Figyelő, introducing the biggest Hungarian companies (Figyelő 
2008) –, plus sending direct e-mails containing the qu stionnaires to some TOP 200 
CFOs and 25 analysts and economists working in domestic banks, consulting firms 
and research institutes. We approached 7 other, middle-sized, Hungary-based com-
panies not listed in TOP 200 by way of personal acqu intance with their managers. 
We also created an on-line version of the questionnaire7, where CFOs and analysts 
could answer the questions anonymously. We have e-mailed the link to this on-line 
version of the questionnaire to only a few CFOs but to all the 25 analysts mentioned 
above. 
The number of respondents was 41, which gives a response ratio of 35%. 
(Surprisingly, the addition of the on-line version f the questionnaire failed to im-
prove this ratio significantly.) Companies operating  the energy sector and in fi-
nance both gave 22% of all respondents, and are closely followed by respondents 
from manufacturing (17%). These 3 groups made up 61% of the total number of re-
spondents, while the share of these sectors in the Hungarian GDP8 was 29.4% in 
2007. We must add, however, that distortions in the representation of individual sec-
tors vis-à-vis their actual weights in GDP are caused partly by the fact that the big-
gest of our respondent companies operates in more than one sectors. Finance is over-
represented in our survey – 22% as opposed to GDP-weight of 4.6% - as analysts 
follow monetary policy decisions the most closely and their opinions are the most 
relevant. Manufacturing is adequately represented, somewhat below its GDP-weight 
of 21.9%. The weight of respondents from commerce is 12%, which equals the sec-
tor’s weight in GDP, while transport-communications is over-represented – 12% 
instead of 8.2%, its GDP-weight. The representation of the rest of the sectors is be-
                                                   
7  The questionnaire is available at http://5mp.eu/fajlok/szixai/kerdoiv_www.5mp.eu_.html. 
8  The GDP-weights of sectors are available at www.ksh.hu. 
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low their GDP-weights. As for the weight of the respondent companies in the corpo-
rate sector, 49% of all respondents are listed in the TOP 200. They give 24% of the 
total net revenue of the first 200 Hungarian companies and can, thus, be considered 
a sizable and representative group.  
Whatever the weights, however, based on the above mentioned number of re-
spondents one can hardly consider this survey a repres ntative one. Its findings are, 
nevertheless, very informative since we get a clearer picture on the opinion of finan-
cial experts about the meaning of credibility of monetary policy and the credibility 
of the Hungarian central bank.  
2.2. Findings of the survey 
In the questionnaire, we asked how closely respondents followed monetary policy 
events between 2002 and 2007 and weighted answers accordingly. Answers of re-
spondents who kept close track of all events (67% of total) - including both deci-
sions and communication - were given a weight of 1. Answers of those respondents 
who only followed either monetary policy communicaton or decisions (14%) were 
given a weight of 2/3. And, finally, answers of those who only followed monetary 
policy events occasionally (19%) were given a weight of 1/3.  
Two-thirds of all respondents agreed that the credibility of monetary policy is de-
termined by the strategy of the central bank (“a coherent central bank strategy aim-
ing to reach a set of announced monetary policy goals”). 59% of all respondents also 
agreed that credibility means good communication (“plausible central bank commu-
nication, capable of orienting markets”). 41% said that credibility is warranted by a 
good track record (“reaching the announced monetary policy goals”) and 37% said 
that credibility means transparency (“transparent monetary policy rules”). Only 17% 
agreed that credibility means accountability (“accountability of central bank deci-
sion-makers”). These results suggest that strategy and communication seem to be the 
core components of monetary policy credibility, according to our respondents, while 
accountability is hardly an issue. The track record an  transparency of monetary pol-
icy are somewhere in the middle: they are of some, but not decisive importance.  
As for the evaluation of monetary policy-making in Hungary between 2002 
and 2007, our respondents gave the MNB the highest poin for its transparency: an 
average of 3.12 out of 5. Strategy came second with an average of 3.07 and track 
record followed with an average of 2.86. Falling behind was communication and 
accountability with averages of 2.47 and 2.28, respectively. This suggests that re-
spondents valued the MNB’s transparency and strategy the most, while they were 
more critical of its communication and accountability over the observed period. It is 
fair to say that they were neutral on its track reco d.  
We also wanted to find out more about the gradual evo ution of opinions on 
these credibility issues over the investigated period. According to the majority who 
answered questions related to this issue, we can say that the MNB was worse off in 
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all but one aspect at the end of the observed period compared to the beginning. The 
only exception was strategy, which they thought wasmore coherent at the end of the 
entire period than it was in 2002. The other four aspects – communication, transpar-
ency, track record and accountability – all received less points at the end of the pe-
riod that in the beginning. Our respondents also indicated in their answers that their 
overall assessment of the MNB’s credibility worsened considerably after October 
19, 2002 – the beginning of the sub period of market turbulence and high volatility 
of the exchange rate. The setback was the most severe (-23%) in the assessment of 
the MNB’s track record and transparency. We think that the formal was probably a 
direct consequence of the central bank’s having missed its 2003 and 2004 inflation 
targets, while the latter is a manifestation of the confusion – caused by sharp course 
reversals of monetary policy – over the relative importance of reaching the inflation 
target and maintaining the floatation band of the exchange rate. Although the overall 
assessment of the MNB recovered somewhat after the volatility of domestic finan-
cial markets subsided, this recovery was, nevertheless, insufficient to improve the 
perception of the MNB’s credibility back to its initial levels. This latter suggests that 
the MNB could not fully repair the damage done to the assessment of its credibility 
during the times of market turbulence.  
2.3. Divergent opinions about credibility outside the survey 
Concluding from answers to the questions of our questionnaire, economists working 
in the business environment identify the concept of credibility of monetary policy 
with different, although interrelated concepts. But, besides the results of the survey, 
it is also worth looking at the remarks that our questionnaire provoked our respon-
dents to make. One analyst who declined to participate in the survey said that the 
questionnaire was too complex and that he did not have an opinion about the evolu-
tion of credibility in the individual sub periods. He pointed out that the only measure 
of credibility was that investors who are wrong in their assessment of credibility of 
monetary policy in a turbulent period will have to pay the price for their wrong as-
sessment.  
Furthermore, three respondents called our attention to the fact that we should 
also deal with the contribution of fiscal policy tohe deterioration of perceived 
credibility of monetary policy and it was partial on our side to only examine the 
credibility of monetary policy. They said that it was probably fiscal rather than 
monetary policy mistakes that caused most of the turbulence in financial markets 
and monetary policy alone could not help avoid it. Another respondent opined that 
changes in the volatility of the euro-forint exchange rate should not be considered as 
the basis of differentiation between the perceptions f credibility within the individ-
ual sub periods. We understood this as saying that changes in exchange rate volatil-
ity had little or nothing to do with changes in the perception of credibility. 
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3. Statistical analysis of the success of MNB’s IT regime 
The first, ex post, approach to the concept of credibility, as we put forward in the 
introduction, is judging the track record, that is, the success of the central bank in 
meeting its target. The findings of our survey also suggest that this analysis is an 
important element of assessing credibility. In case of the Hungarian IT regime, it is 
plain to see from chart 1 that the inflation target – which is set together by MNB and 
the Ministry of Finance – was missed 5 out of 9 years (2003, 2004, 2006, 2007 and 
2008). 




























Source: own collection from www.ksh.hu and www.mnb.hu 
Since the Hungarian headline CPI inflation target is a common nominal target of the 
monetary and fiscal policy, and the target can only be attained through the coordina-
tion of the monetary and fiscal sides, the simple fact that the target was missed in a 
majority of the cases so far tells little about thecr dibility of the IT regime. To in-
vestigate MNB’s responsibility in this issue, it is necessary to narrow our analysis. 
We will first look at a simple comparative statistical overview of the period before 
and after the introduction of IT in June 2001 using a seasonally adjusted inflation 
measure, which filters out the impact of tax rate changes (VAICPI computed by the 
Central Statistical Office (KSH)). Clearly, it was most often the exogenous changes 
in VAT, excise and other tax rates by fiscal policy that deterred the headline CPI 
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inflation rate from the target. Filtering out tax rate changes from the headline CPI 
inflation measure better shows just how much MNB contributed to lowering and/or 
stabilizing the inflation rate. It can be seen from a look at chart 2 that VAICPI be-
came lower and less volatile in the IT era compared with the pre-IT era. 



















































































































































































Source: own collection from www.ksh.hu, www.mnb.hu and MNB staff 
For a detailed comparison of the two periods of similar length, table 2 presents the 
fundamental statistics.  
Table 2. VAICPI dynamics in the pre-IT and the IT eras 
 Q1 1993-Q2 2001 Q3 2001-Q1 2009 
Number of Observations 34 31 
Average 17.75% 5.24% 
Standard Deviation 6.46% 1.40% 
Coefficient of Variation 36.37% 26.64% 
Persistence 84.64% 85.53% 
Range 21.23% 5.55% 
Minimum 9.10% 2.98% 
Maximum 30.33% 8.54% 
Source: own calculations based on data from www.ksh.hu and www.mnb.hu 
Apparently, all relevant statistics point to an amelioration of inflation dynamics after 
the introduction of IT, as attested by the VAICPI measure. The volatility and aver-
age of inflation subsided, along with their ratio, the coefficient of variation. The 
range, maximum and minimum all decreased substantially. The only exception is the 
Pre-IT era 
IT era 
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persistence of inflation, which is the extent to which the average inflation rate of the 
previous quarter determines the average inflation rate of the following quarter. The 
fact is that slightly higher inflation persistence is even desirable in a generally lower 
inflation environment, which characterizes the IT period vis-à-vis the pre-IT era. 
Therefore, it does not alter the overall perception hat, from a static point of view, 
inflation was harnessed in following the introduction of IT. 
3.1. Inflation stationarity before and after the introduction of IT 
It should be noted, however, that inflation is a dynamic phenomenon, so this simple 
statistical comparison should be complemented by a more advanced test that ac-
counts for the dynamic nature of inflation. We apply the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test with drift to see if the above time series of the seasonally adjusted quarterly av-
erage change of year-on-year VAICPI has a unit root. The equation we use in this 





uy∆θσya∆y +++= −=− ∑ , 
 
where yt is the logarithm of the inflation measure and k, the lag order of the autore-
gressive process, is initially set to equal 5. 
The results of the test are unsurprising given the precedents. In the pre-IT pe-
riod, we cannot conclude to reject the null hypothesis of σ=0, meaning that VAICPI 
inflation was a non-stationary process until June 2001. Regardless of the lag length, 
the test statistics show that, in the pre-IT era, the inflation rate of previous periods 
failed to significantly determine the inflation rate of the following period. On the 
other hand, the test statistic for the IT-era was significant at 5% level, with a p-value 
of 0.0223 and a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.0683. The test statistic was significant 
using shorter or longer lag operators, as well. Based on this result, one can conclude 
that VAICPI inflation became mean-reverting or, in other words, anchored, after the 
introduction of IT. Although the cause-effect link is unclear, one can reasonably as-
sume that this was at least partly owing to the anti-inflation measures taken by MNB 
according to the logic of the IT regime.  
4. Comparative analysis of MNB MC’s predictability 
We will now go on to discuss the simple ex ante aspects of credibility. We begin 
with the concept of predictability, which, as we stated in the introduction, is the 
manifestation of a central bank’s transparency and, as such, is a prerequisite for 
building credibility. Here, we follow the methodology first introduced by Gaspar, 
Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2001) and later used by Ross (2002) and Perez-Quiros and 
Sicilia (2002) to assess the predictability of the European Central Bank. Pintér and 
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Wenhardt (2004) applied this methodology first on the Hungarian experience. This 
simple methodology can be used in a relative context to compare the predictability 
of the decisions of MNB MC with those of the decision-making bodies of other cen-
tral banks. 
This model compares the actual short-term market int rest rate after the inter-
est rate decision with expectations as reflected in short-term market interest rates 
before the decision. The model assumes that interest rate decisions can have two 
possible outcomes: one is when the MC decide to change the base rate (the interest 
rate paid on the two-week MNB bond, which is the key policy-making tool of the 
central bank) by either 25 or 50 basis points and another is when the base rate is left 
unchanged. That is 
 
t1tt i25)i(E +β=+ , or                                                [1] 
t1tt i50)i(E +β=+ ,                                                    [2] 
 
where Et(i t+1) is the base rate expected for time t+1 at time t as implied by the short-
term market interest rate (2-week Bubor in the Hungarian case) ahead of the rate 
decision, and it is the base rate before the decision, both measured in basis points. β
is the probability of an interest rate change – positive when a rate hike is expected 
and negative otherwise. When β is more than or equal to 50% (or 0.5), we judge that
the market expects a rate change ahead of the rate decision. Models [1] and [2] only 
differ in the presumption that interest rate changes usually amount to either 25 or 50 
basis points in the monetary policy routine. In MNB’s case, model [2] seems a more 
suitable choice. 
We have created three plus one different categories to evaluate the predict-
ability of base rate decisions based on how well thse decisions were anticipated by 
the short-term market interest rate. Based on this, a decision is precisely anticipated, 
imprecisely anticipated, or unanticipated and there is also the possibility that the 
market expects a change in vain. We consider a decision precisely anticipated when 
the difference between Et(i t+1) and it+1 is less than 12.5 basis points in model [1] or 
less than 25 basis points in model [2]. A decision is considered imprecisely antici-
pated when the market expects the direction of the change well but misses its extent 
by 12.5 basis points or more in model [1] or by 25 basis points or more in model [2]. 
A decision is deemed unanticipated if the market misses the direction of the change 
or if it expects a change when there is none or if it expects no-change when there is 
change. The fourth (plus one) category includes instances when interest rate changes 
are anticipated in vain, that is, when either a rate cut or a rate hike is expected but 
does not happen. 
The predictability of MNB MC’s base rate decisions is worse in most aspects 
than that of the central banks of 4 developed and 4 emerging countries – or region in 
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the case of the Euro zone – in our sample9. According to model [1], MNB ranks 5th 
(2nd in the emerging peer group) in the overall hit rate that quantifies the share of all 
– precisely or imprecisely – anticipated decisions. It has the worst record (9th) in the 
anticipation of interest rate changes, and has the 3rd highest record in the anticipation 
of interest rate no-changes. As for the reliability of the indication of interest rate 
changes expected by the market, MNB’s record is only better than that of the NBP 
(8th).  
According to model [2], respective ranks are 6th, 8th, 5th and 7th. Using this 
model, the relative forecasting ability of market in erest rates is slightly lower be-
cause model [2] shows deterioration in the predictab li y of interest rate no-changes 
compared to model [1]. On the other hand, the relativ  reliability of anticipations of 
interest rate change is higher than in model [1]10. Model [2] predictability statistics 
are presented in table 3. 
Table 3. Predictability of central bank rate decisions by model [2] 
 MNB ECB Fed Riks-
bank 
BoE SARB CBRT CNB NBP Average 
Overall 
Hit Rate 67% 89% 75% 82% 76% 61% 63% 70% 56% 73% 
Rate 
Changes 22% 63% 70% 34% 31% 62% 68% 19% 38% 43% 
No-
changes 91% 94% 78% 95% 96% 60% 58% 97% 67% 86% 
Reliabil-
ity of 
Changes 58% 70% 63% 73% 70% 58% 54% 75% 38% 64% 
Number 
of Meet-
ings 139 157 130 72 144 54 43 138 100 - 
Source: own calculations based on data available on central bank websites 
In assessing the predictability of MNB MC’s decisions in itself, it should be noted 
that the predictability of their interest rate changes is made low by the poor predict-
ability of their decisions to lower the policy rate. To illustrate this fact, we sketched 
in chart 3 the cumulated predictability as of model [2] on a scale of ±100 points to-
gether with the policy rate in the period stretching from July 2001 to April 2009.  
                                                   
9  Developed peers in the sample are the ones with the world’s oldest, most established mone-
tary systems: the United States (Fed), the Euro zone (ECB), the United Kingdom (BoE) and Sweden 
(Riksbank). Emerging peers are taken from the so called Europe, Middle East, Africa (EMEA) region: 
the Czech Republic (CNB), Poland (NBP), Turkey (CBRT) and South Africa (SARB). In the entire 
sample, the Fed is the only central bank that does n t operate a formal IT regime, but is also responsi-
ble for maintaining price stability as a central task. 
10  This has to do with the specifications of the model, since surprises caused by rate decisions 
according to model [1] are not necessarily surprises in model [2]. Therefore, model [2] tends to im-
prove the anticipation ratio of policy rate no-changes, while it reduces the anticipation ratio of rate 
changes. 
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Source: own calculations based on data from www.mnb.hu 
Chart 3 shows that MNB MC’s cumulated predictability as of model [2] is +33 
points (+13 points in model [1]) and there were both ups and downs in the path of 
the curve. Most of the downward spirals were triggered by serial rate cut decisions 
(e.g. the series of rate cuts in early 2002, 2005 or late 2008). According to model [2], 
financial investors anticipated only 12% of MNB MC’s rate cuts (24% in model 
[1]), while they anticipated 44% of the rate hikes (88% in model [1]) in the observed 
IT period. It seems that, for some reason, financial investors find it harder to predict 
MNB MC’s rate cut decisions, which weighs considerably on the relative assess-
ment of MNB’s credibility. 
On a whole, there is no significant difference for MNB between the results of 
model [1] or [2]. In both models, MNB’s average rank is between 6th and 7th in the 
overall sample, and MNB’s scores exceed the sample average only in the case of 
anticipation of interest rate no-changes. It means that the relative predictability of 
MNB MC’s interest rate changes is low. Table 4 summarizes the rankings of central 
banks by the aspects of the two predictability models. 
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Table 4. Relative predictability of MNB MC decisions 




















1. ECB ECB CNB CNB ECB Fed CNB CNB 
2. CNB Fed ECB Fed Riks-
bank 
CBRT BoE Riksbank 
3. Fed SARB MNB CBRT BoE ECB Riks-
bank 
ECB 
4. BoE CBRT Fed SARB Fed SARB ECB BoE 
5. MNB BoE BoE BoE CNB NBP MNB Fed 
6. CBRT Riksbank Riks-
bank 
ECB MNB Riksbank Fed SARB 
7. Riks-
bank 
CNB CBRT Riksbank CBRT BoE NBP MNB 
8. SARB NBP NBP MNB SARB MNB SARB CBRT 
9. NBP MNB SARB NBP NBP CNB CBRT NBP 
Source: own calculations based on data available on central bank websites 
4.1. Gradualism of MNB MC’s interest rate decisions 
As suggested by Blinder (2006), an important element in the predictability of central 
bank decisions is the frequency distribution of interest rate changes, which shows 
how gradual these changes are. In MNB’s case, a comparison with the average of 
the rest of the central banks in the sample seems useful11. 
The frequency distribution chart, presented in chart 4, eveals that MNB MC 
displayed a tendency to make less gradual interest rate decisions than the average of 
the sample. Comparing the frequency distribution of MNB MC’s rate decisions to 
that of the average of all 8 other central bank in the sample, we can conclude that 
MNB has operated with changes of 25 basis points or lower less often than the aver-
age (35% vs. 56%), while it has more 50-basis-point changes on record than the av-
erage of the sample (49% vs. 24%). 
                                                   
11  When computing the averages we weight by the actual n mber of interest rate decisions. 
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Source: own calculations based on data available on central bank websites 
Comparing MNB routine to that of the central banks of developed countries in the 
sample, the contrast is even starker as 77% of all interest rate changes in the devel-
oped countries’ peer group have been changes of 25 basis points or lower, and only 
18% have been changes of 50 basis points. In comparison with the average of the 
emerging peer group – which excludes Hungary, of course –, the ratio of small 
changes (0.25% or lower) is almost equal (35% for MNB MC vs. 33% for the peer 
group). On the other hand, the ratio of MNB MC’s 50-basis-point changes has been 
almost double that of the emerging peer group (49% vs. 25%), while the ratio of 
changes of more than 50 basis points is lower (16% vs. 37%). Clearly, MNB MC 
relied significantly more on 50-basis-point rate changes and less on changes of more 
than 50 basis points in the observed period than the average of the emerging peer 
group12. 
When we restrict the timeframe of observation to a shorter period, in which all 
the central banks in the sample were given independence in changing the policy rate 
according to the logic of the IT regime – expect, of c urse, for the Fed, which does 
not operate such a regime –, MNB MC’s gradualism appe rs to have fallen behind 
even the average of the emerging peer group. In conclusion, MNB MC have made 
less gradual policy rate decisions than the average of the peer group in both ob-
served periods, and their decisions become less gradual when we only take into ac-
count the more recent years. 
                                                   
12  Especially, the SARB and the CBRT tend to have frequently changed policy rates by more 
than 0,5%. As we show in the next subsection, it has to do with the fact that the level of interest rates in 
these two countries was mostly above 10% throughout the period. This later argument is bolstered by 
the fact that the Polish Monetary Policy Council abandoned the practice of changing the policy rate by 
more than 0.5% after its policy rate fell below 10%. 
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4.2. The correlation of ranks by predictability, gradualism and the average level 
of policy rates 
This can, of course, be explained partly by the lower level of interest rates in devel-
oped economies: the lower the level of interest rates, the smaller the extent of inter-
est rate changes necessary to reach a certain monetary policy goal. It can be said that 
50-basis-point changes become scarce under interest rat  levels of 5-6%. For in-
stance, the Hungarian policy rate was only below 6% temporarily – for 5 weeks – in 
the entire examined period13, which is one explanation for MNB’s lower rank in 
gradualism. 
Table 5 shows the rankings of central banks according to predictability, 
gradualism, maximum and minimum levels of policy rates in the respective IT peri-
ods14, all ending in April 2009. Apparently, there is a clear gap between the groups 
of central banks of developed and emerging countries. In the developed group and in 
the Czech Republic, the average level of the policy rate was below 5%, and these 
central banks proved to be more gradual and predictable in their decisions than the 
rest of the sample. 
























ECB 2.25 3. 1. 4. 1. 3.06% 01.1999-  
Fed 3.25 2. 5. 3. 3. 3.94% 01.1995-  
CNB 3.25 1. 3. 5. 4. 4.44% 01.1998-  
BoE 3.5 4. 4. 1. 5. 4.99% 06.1997-  
Riks-
bank 
3.5 8. 2. 2. 2. 3.12% 01.2000-  
MNB 6.75 7. 6. 7. 7. 8.62% 07.2001-  
NBP 7.5 9. 9. 6. 6. 6.75% 01.2001-  
CBRT 7.5 5. 8. 8. 9. 15.84% 01.2006-  
SARB 7.5 6. 7. 9. 8. 9.81% 01.2001-  
Source: own calculations based on data available on central bank websites 
                                                   
13  From January 17 until February 24, the policy rate was 3.5%, the rate of interest MNB paid 
on overnight deposits placed by commercial banks with the central bank. The availability of the 2-week 
deposit was restricted throughout this period. 
14  This applies for all except for the cases of Poland nd Sweden. For Poland, we could only 
find market interest rates from January 2001 to calcul te predictability, although the NBP has been 
operating IT since 1999. For Sweden, we applied January 2000 instead of January 1993 – the formal 
start of the IT regime – as the beginning of the period of observation since the Riksbank were granted 
full independence in their interest rate decisions at that point of time. 
15  Ranks are calculated as the average of ranks by the overall hit rate and the reliability of 
changes. 
16  Ranks are set in order of the share of interest rate changes of 25 basis points or lower. 
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Calculating the Spearman rank correlation17 for the correlation of the different rank-
ings in the IT periods, we conclude the followings. The link is very strong (0.85) 
between the ranking by predictability as of model [2] and the ranking by the average 
level of policy rates throughout the period. The ranking by gradualism and by the 
average level of policy rates also show strong correlation with each other (0.77). 
(The ranking by the first predictability model does not show significant correlation 
with any other rankings.) 








Average Level of 
Policy Rate 
Predictability [1] - 0.47 0.25 0.33 
Predictability [2] - - 0.67 0.85 
Gradualism - - - 0.77 
Source: own calculations based on the rankings in Table 5 
In table 7, we present rankings based on a broader period of observation, which is 
the longest period that we found relevant for measuring the gradualism of policy rate 
decisions and the average level of policy rates for the respective central banks. 
MNB’s rank improves one notch as it takes 6th place in gradualism and the average 
level of interest rate from NBP. However, this improvement is, in fact, deterioration 
as it indicates that NBP started off in a less favor ble interest rate environment and 
could still lower its policy rate and improve the gradualism of its decisions more 
successfully than MNB. 
                                                   







−= , where di is the difference between the 
individual country ranks by two different aspects and n is the total number of ranks in the sample. Italic 
figures in the tables show significance at the 5% level of significance (ρ>0,683), bold at 2% (ρ>0.783) 
and bold and italic at the same time at 1% (ρ>0.833). 
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1. 2. 3.98% 8.91% 0.5% 06.1994-  
BoE 2. 4. 4.99% 7.5% 0.5% 06.1997-  
Fed 3. 3. 4.60% 9.625% 0 - 0.25% 08.1987-  
ECB 4. 1. 3.06% 4.75% 1.25% 01.1999-  
CNB 5. 5. 5.80% 39% 1.75% 12.1995-  
MNB 6. 6. 8.62% 12.5% 3.5%13 07.2001-  
NBP 7. 7. 9.55% 24% 3.75% 01.1998-  
CBRT 8. 9. 23.42% 57% 9.75% 02.2002-  
SARB 9. 8. 10.05% 13.5% 7% 11.1999-  
Source: own calculations based on data available on central bank websites 
The Spearman rank correlations based on the broader period show an even closer 
correlation between the ranking by predictability as of model [2] based on data from 
the previously observed IT period, and the ranking by radualism and by the average 
level of policy rates, as seen in table 8. 
Table 8. Spearman rank correlations in the broader period 




Average Level of 
Policy Rate 
Predictability [2]* - 0.78 0.78 
Gradualism - - 0.87 
*Based on the shorter, IT period. 
Source: own calculations based on the rankings in Table 7 
These results suggest that the rankings of central banks by gradualism and predict-
ability are closely correlated with their ranking by the average levels of interest 
rates, which is a way of saying that central banks appear to be more predictable in 
their decisions in an international comparison if the average level of their policy in-
terest rate is lower and they take a more gradual appro ch in their decisions. The 
reverse of this argument partly explains why MNB ranks behind central banks of 
developed countries and the Czech Republic in predictability. MNB could neither 
lower interest rates to the critical level nor take  gradual enough approach in its de-
cision-making to make its decisions become significantly more predictable by finan-
cial investors. 
                                                   
18  Ranks are set in order of the ratio of interest rate changes of 25 basis points or lower. 
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5. Consistency of communication 
Communication, as shown by the literature review as well as the results of the sur-
vey, is a seminal component of successful monetary policy-making. Much has been 
said about MNB’s communication with financial markets but little actual analysis 
has been carried out to see whether the communication of MNB’ governor and the 
Monetary Council helped build the credibility of the IT regime or not. An exception 
is Rozkrut et al. (2007), who, amongst others, introduce a new measure, the so called 
consistency indicator, to appraise the consistency of central bank communication. 
The consistency indicator can be applied to measure the consistency of the commu-
nication of the Monetary Council or that of the central bank governor ahead of each 
interest rate decision. Similarly to cumulated predictability, it is calculated as a cu-
mulative measure building in the values given for each rate decision. We give a 
value of 1 if the sign of the difference between the geometric mean of the base rate 
in the three months following the rate decision and market (e.g. 2-week, 1-month, 
3-month Bubor, 3-month T-bill) interest rate on the day before the decision coin-
cides with the sign of communication19 by the MC or the governor in the period 
leading up to the rate decision. This is because if the two signs coincide then it can 
be said that the central banks oriented investors in the right direction. Taking the 
cumulated value of this indicator and plotting it on a ±100-point scale, we get chart 
5, which can be viewed as a track record of communication. 
                                                   
19  Naturally, a positive value in communication is an early indication of tightening and a nega-
tive is an early indication of easing. In case of the MC, we discern the monetary policy bias from the 
communiqué published after the most recent rate decision and consider it as indication of future mone-
tary policy ahead of the upcoming rate decision. MCcommunication is given a value of 1 when it is 
deemed to be hawkish – hinting a rate hike in the future –, -1 when it is thought to be dovish – hinting a 
rate cut in the future – and 0 when it is considere to be neutral in its predictions of the path future 
monetary policy will take. In the case of the governor we take the average of his comments in the pe-
riod between two consecutive rate decisions and use it as indication of the direction of the next rate 
decision. Similarly to the MC case, values of the individual comments made by the governor are given 
1, -1 or 0 depending on their monetary policy bias. The only difference is that, in the case of the gover-
nor, there can be more than one comment in the interim periods. Thus, the sum of the values attached to 
the individual comments is divided by the total number of comments made in the interim period. 
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Source: own calculations based on data from www.akk.hu and www.mnb.hu 
The values of this consistency indicator for MNB MC range from -29 to -47 depend-
ing on which market interest rate we use in our calcul tion. We get similar figures (-
32 to -49) when we plot the consistency indicator of the governor’s communication 
ahead of rate decisions20. These figures send a strong message to policy-makers: 
they suggest that neither the bias statements included in the MC’s post-decision 
communiqués nor the statements made by the central bank governor in the interim 
period served as good predictors of subsequent policy changes. To put it in a starker 
form, the central bank’s MC and its governor more oft n misled financial investors 
speculating over the future path of policy rates than guided them in the right direc-
tion. And not only did they fail to indicate the future path of policy rates, the mes-
sages conveyed by the two sources of communication were more often contradictory 
than unequivocal. In chart 6, we plotted the directon of indications of the future 
path of policy rates as implied by MNB MC communiqués and comments by the 
governor in between rate decisions in the period frm July 2001 until April 2009. 
Times when the indications point to different directions – e.g. in 2004 and 2005, the 
governor continuously communicated tightening, while the MC communiqués sig-
naled easing or maintaining monetary conditions – are when central bank talk is 
simply counterproductive and destroying credibility. 
                                                   
20  To calculate these latter figures we collected all comments made by the governor in the ob-
served period. Our sources included www.budacash.hu, www.ebroker.hu, www.fn.hu, www.hirtv.net, 
www.index.hu, www.mno.hu, www.napi.hu, www.nol.hu, www.otpbank.hu, www.portfolio.hu, 
www.raiffeisen.hu, www.reuters.hu, www.tozsdeforum.hu, www.vg.hu. Our database is available on 
request. 
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Chart 6.  Communication on future policy by MNB MC and the governor 
Governor:
     >0: Hawkish









           1: Tighten
        0: Hold







Governor comments MC Bias
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 
Source: own calculations based on data from www.mnb.hu and own press collection 
6. Conclusions 
The above analysis is only a preliminary investigation into the complex concept of 
evolving credibility of the Hungarian IT regime. It avoids a number of delicate is-
sues – such as the inherent conflict between the IT regime and the exchange rate 
band or the (lack of) coordination with fiscal policy – in order to simplify the analy-
sis. It presents the results of the observations motly without explaining the facts. 
This analysis should be complemented by a thorough account of the historical condi-
tions in which MNB had to operate in the observed priod, as some of these condi-
tions played a decisive role in central bank decision . We plan to elaborate on these 
aspects in another paper. 
 
Nevertheless, we can draw a few conclusions from the results by answering the 
questions posed in the introduction: 
 
1. Narrative evidence tells us that the credibility of the Hungarian monetary 
policy as perceived by the stakeholders of monetary policy deteriorated be-
tween 2002 and 2007. The respondents of our short survey confirmed that 
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central bank communication, which most of them deemed an integral 
component of credibility, became worse by the end of the period. 
2. The introduction of inflation targeting in Hungary brought about the an-
choring of inflation dynamics. Although the headline CPI inflation targets 
were missed in the majority of years between 2001 and 2009, the analysis 
of the VAICPI time series shows that this measure of inflation – which ig-
nores the price shocks caused by tax changes – became st tionary after the 
introduction of IT in June 2001. 
3. The predictability and gradualism of MNB MC’s interest rate decisions 
were relatively low in the observed period compared to other central banks 
in the developed peer group and mediocre compared to other central banks 
in the emerging peer group. 
4. Central bank communication failed to signal future policy rate decisions 
properly in the observed period. The consistency of communication by 
both MNB MC and the central bank governor were low and their indica-
tions of future policy moves were sometimes contradictory. 
References 
Amisano, G. – Tronzano, M. 2005: Assessing ECB’s Credibility During the First 
Years of the Eurosystem: A Bayesian Empirical Investigation. University of 
Brescia, Department of Economics Working Papers, 0512, 1-25. p. 
Blinder, A. S. 1999: Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We 
Build It? NBER Working Paper Series, 7161, 1-23. p. 
Blinder, A. S. 2006: Monetary policy today: Sixteen questions and about twelve an-
swers. Center for Economic Policy Studies Working Papers, 129, 1-65. p. 
Figyelő 2008: Figyelő TOP 200 ‘2007. Figyelő, Budapest. 
Gaspar, V. – Perez-Quiros, G. – Sicilia, J. 2001: The ECB Monetary Policy Strategy 
and the Money Market. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 6, 4, 
325-342. p. 
Goldberg, L. S. – Klein, W. M. 2005: Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions 
of the European Central Bank. NBER Working Paper Series, 11792, 1-28. p. 
Madár, I. 2003: Az árfolyam nem javíthat versenyképességet. Világgazdaság, June 
26, retrieved December 30, 2009 from http://vg.hu/velemeny/interju/az-
arfolyam-nem-javithat-versenykepesseget-36094.  
Mishkin, F. S. 2004: Can Inflation Targeting Work in Emerging Market Countries? 
NBER Working Paper Series, 10646, 1-34. p. 
Mishkin, F. S. – Schmidt-Hebbel, K. 2007: Does Inflation Targeting Make a Differ-
ence? NBER Working Paper Series, 12876, 1-64. p. 
Nyíri M. 2003: Fokozódó bizalomhiány. Magyar Hírlap Online, July 28, retrieved 
May 12, 2009, from 





Perez-Quiros, G. – Sicilia, J. 2002: Is the European Central Bank (and the United 
States Federal Reserve) Predictable? ECB Working Papers, 192, 1-61. p. 
Pintér, K. – Wenhardt, T. 2004: A jegybanki kamatdöntések előrejelezhetősége és 
hatása a hozamokra. MNB Műhelytanulmányok, 31, 1-48. p. 
Ross, K. 2002: Market Predictability of ECB Monetary Policy Decisions: A Com-
parative Examination. IMF Working Papers, 233, 1-53. p. 
Rozkrut, M. – Rybinski, K. – Sztaba, L. – Szwaja, R. 2007: Quest for central bank 
communication: Does it pay to be “talkative”? European Journal of Political 
Economy, 23, 1, 176-206. p. 
The Economist 2004: The Balcerowicz effect. The Economist, January 29, retrieved 
December 28, 2009, from 
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystor .cfm?story_id=E1_N
PRRSPN&source=login_payBarrier 
Woodford, M. 2005: Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness. NBER 
Working Paper Series, 11898, 1-65. p. 
 
























Miklós Erdélyi –Szabolcs Szikszai 
 
26 
www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/eng/ 
www.tozsdeforum.hu 
www.vg.hu 
 
